IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

KATERI LYNNE DAHL,
Plaintiff,

VS. * CASE NO.

* $\underline{2:22-CV-00072-KAC-CRW}$ CHIEF KARL TURNER, in his individual *

capacity only; OFFICER JOHN DOES 1-3, in their individual capacities only; and CITY OF JOHNSON CITY,

Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF

ERIC DAIGLE

(Taken December 28, 2023)

APPEARANCES:

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ALEXIS I. TAHINCI TAHINCI LAW FIRM

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THIS STYLE PAGE CONTINUES

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INTERIM ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER

CITY OF JOHNSON CITY

CATHY BALL
CITY MANAGER

CITY OF JOHNSON CITY

- -- I would be talking about a USA or an AUSA on the federal law side, but...
 - Q. Sure. Do you know if this sexual assault protocol that Steve Finney promulgated applies to federal prosecutions?
 - A. I don't. I don't know if the federal USA in the area has said we agree or not. I don't know.
 - Q. Okay. I'm going to get to Finding 2, which is the material deficiencies with JCPD sexual assault investigations. And your first sentence there says that Johnson City's investigative practices were found to compromise the effectiveness of the response to sexual assault and led to under-enforcement of sexual assault laws in Tennessee. Was there a certain -- what evidence formed the basis of that conclusion?
 - A. Again, I'm reviewing all of the cases for failures, and the failures are identified in the remainder of the findings section.
 - Q. Okay. You -- you particularly make reference in this paragraph to non-stranger sexual assault. Was that a particularized issue with Johnson City investigations based on your review?
 - A. As it says in the -- in the bottom there, that there were -- as we identified failures in cases, we also identified a pattern that these cases specifically fell into that category.

- Q. Okay. And when you say a pattern, can you tell me sort of what underlying facts you notice that form the pattern?
- A. Well, I would have to take a look at the majority, you know. The spreadsheets are there looking at, you know, did -- was the victim interviewed, was evidence collected, was the suspect interviewed, or comments that were made in the investigation which show -- which show or can be interpreted as some form of bias in that those were the things that we found as consistent in the cases that were prominently identified to be challenges.
- Q. When you say bias, what do you mean by that?
- Α. Well, there's two types of biases in our world, and that is, you know, implicit and explicit. And explicit, as you know, is, you know, sexism and racism as a type. And then implicit are biases that can be formed by many applications. As investigators, it is the goal of supervisors and investigators to be -- to be trained and supervised to ensure that no implicit biases can come into Some of the ones that I clarified here could be, you know, the fact that there was a dating relationship, and then there was an allegation of a sexual assault, or that the female victim was a prostitute, or a drug user, or had a long history of different types of conduct. And oftentimes the challenge is to ensure that the investigators don't use their biases, their experience

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- and their history, to determine the credibility of a victim's complaint.
- Q. And you noticed a pattern of bias by Johnson City in investigating sex crimes?
- A. In the departments -- in the cases that were a failure.

 And I think it's again -- I'm going to say it again and again, which is not all of the cases were failures. There was good work done by men and women at Johnson City Police Department. But the ones that failed, you know, they failed -- they failed. And when we evaluated why they were shown as a failure, these are the things that were identified in the process.
- Q. What constitutes a failure in your view?
- A. As I said, we're going to go through the categories as the assessment matrix, and then when we start to identify more than one case has -- has not done the things that we would expect them to do, we're going to start asking questions as to why they didn't do it and start looking at trying to identify what the challenges were. And when we dig deeper into the reports, a lot of times the biases will come out in the reports based on statements such as, you know, these individuals were in a dating relationship and then the victim came and gave a sexual -- a complaint of sexual assault. And now the victim doesn't want to -- doesn't want to continue the investigation, case closed. And

we're like, well, wait a minute. That's not -- that's not supposed to be the way that that works. Or the victim has a long history as a prostitute or has a long history of drug addiction, you know. And just because they have these things in their history, you know, doesn't automatically disqualify them from being a victim and the investigator needs to do more work to ensure that the disqualification, you know, the evidence is clarified.

- Q. Thank you. Turning to the next page, Page 15, you had Finding 3 that JCPD's investigations were found to be inconsistent, ineffective, and incomplete. And I know we talked about sort of some investigations being good and some being failures. Out of these 325 cases that you reviewed, do you have an opinion on the number of good cases versus failures?
- A. Not without looking at my spreadsheets, no.
- Q. Okay. Would the spreadsheet indicate to you a number?
- A. No. You know, it would. If you sit there and do the math, you're going to see...
- Q. Sure.

A. ...here's -- let's just give an example. Here's 25 cases, and as you go down across the board, here's the cases that didn't do something that they should have done. And as we look at those -- those quality of those cases, that assessment tool, along with our assessment of the

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is preservation of evidence, destruction of evidence. 1 2 could -- you know, as spending, you know, decades doing this, you don't have to even go in and search. 3 You can just go in and hold, and get a warrant, and make sure 5 you're meeting the needs. But at least the key part is 6 when some officers -- one of the things that we saw, as I 7 identify in here, is that when you have information that something like a sexual assault occurred in a certain 8 9 area, you know, for purposes of determining and the 10 protection of both the victim and the accused, you know, 11 you want to get that, you want to go in there and get that 12 And that has been -- that's a law enforcement 13 practice, you know. That's criminal procedure, criminal 14 investigation 101.

- Q. Got it, okay. So, for example, if a woman is outside of a residence, she's hysterical, she claims that she has just been sexually assaulted, is there exigency for a responding officer to at least try to hold the scene to prevent destruction of evidence?
- A. I think there is.
- Q. Okay, thank you. And if an officer didn't hold the scene, it could logically flow that a suspect could destroy or tamper with evidence?
- 24 MR. HERRIN: Object to the form of the question.
- 25 A. It's possible.

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- Q. For example, he could do laundry, wash the sheets, right?
- 2 | A. True.

- Q. Yeah, okay. Thank you. Recommendation -- turning back to Page 17, there's recommendation 3a. It says Johnson City should develop a checklist for all sex related investigations by responding officers and supervisors to ensure consistency in collecting and documenting evidence. I take it by the language you use here, the verb "should," that no such checklist existed at the time of your audit.
- A. We did not receive any type of checklist.
- Q. Is it industry standard to have such a checklist?
- A. I think well-functioning investigative units would want that for at least the responding officers. You're talking about inexperienced officers who, you know, they're not going to remember all of the steps that they should take. And you don't want to -- you know, you don't want to -- the way that -- the way that myself and my team look at it is that I'm not worried about your feelings here, I'm worried about the fact that you got everything done. And so I think a checklist is val' -- we use checklists in different types of investigations to just ensure that if the individual who gets dispatched to this crime is a brand new officer and has no experience that -- that, you know, they are -- they have something to refer to make sure that they're doing everything in their power.

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didn't exist, I don't know.

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- Q. Okay, fair enough. But in terms of this recommendation 3c when you talk about accountability for supervisors, officers, and investigators, what do you mean by that?
- So if you go back to the beginning of the document, we had Α. that image that we talked about, policy, training, and supervision, right? The way that we build strong organizational operations is to make sure that supervisors and people who do the job are held accountable for doing it the way they're supposed to. And, you know, that changes over the years. A new officer is not going to have the experience and the time to learn how to do it correctly, so as a checks and balance to the system, we would expect that his supervisor, or her supervisor or command staff, or that we're checking to make sure that these things are being held accountable. And so on all the things that we talked about to this point, you know, not doing search warrants, not securing scenes, not taking statements, whatever the failures that we identified or the concerns that we identified, my biggest question is going to be where was the supervisor or where was the command staff to make sure that this got done, and why -why -- why do we need an outside assessment to find things that we should be finding ourselves along -- along the process.

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- Q. Can you tell me more about some of the failures of supervision in having case documentation and proper case files?
- Well, I mean, I can only -- I can only utilize my Α. experience with departments, and that is that we are built in a mechanism that there are all -- there's always a lot of checks and balances to ensure effectiveness. the checks and balances is an on-scene supervisor or a sergeant working that's going to go out and help the officer on the scene make sure that they do it correctly. That these same supervisors are going to be reviewing the reports that the -- that the officers are submitting. know, the purpose of that supervisor is to make sure that they're following department policy and training. then there's command staff above the supervisors. And the same thing even in the criminal investigations unit, which is, you know, you have sergeants, and you have lieutenants, you have captains, you have deputy chiefs and The reason for these ranks are not just to hold the position, but to be the checks and balances for -- for the effectiveness of the agency to make sure that they are one in protecting their people and that things are being documented and done correctly, and, if not, that they're taking action to address it.
- Q. And it is your opinion that there were failures here at

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Johnson City as to sex crimes by these supervisors?

A. Yes.

- Q. And particularly, there were failures by these supervisors at Johnson City as to the Sean Williams cases that you reviewed?
- A. I guess I say yes because, you know, especially the one we used for an example, you know, why wasn't the scene secured? If there's supervisors on scene, maybe the officer doesn't understand what's supposed to be done, but I do expect the experienced supervisors to understand what's supposed to be done.
- Q. And you have no explanation -- sorry, strike that. You have no good explanation for why these supervisory failures occurred.
- MR. HERRIN: Object to the form of the question.
- 16 A. I don't know why, correct.
 - Q. Thank you. Turning back to Page 19, line "d", the case file records were deficient in the documentation of witness interviews. A threshold question, in the context of sex crimes, who is a witness?
 - A. It could be anybody who witnessed it, you know, other -other people in the room, other people at the party, other
 people in the area, you know, medical staff that treated
 the person, you know. A witness is very broad, so again,
 case by case. Sometimes there are no witnesses, but if

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- Q. And you are not involved in Johnson City implementing these measures.
- A. I'm not, no.

- Q. Okay, great. Thank you. Turning to Page 24, you have "g", JCPD's response to sexual assault was challenged based on gender-based stereotypes and bias. And then there's specific statements by investigators and department leadership that women reporting non-stranger sexual assault are lying, and that such assaults are less severe and traumatic to victims than other serious crimes. Can you elaborate on that statement to me? What were you referring to?
- A. So, in speaking with different investigators, and I believe the key one here was Investigator Dunn, there was some directions that command staff in the investigative application, and maybe in other areas of the department, would make allegations or assumptions based on the position or the situation that the female was in at the time of the alleged assault, and therefore was lying as a result of it. And obviously, that is -- that is biased, and it's biased as to the victims, and it needs to be -- it has no place in sexual assault investigations.
- Q. Did Investigator Dunn identify which supervisors held those views?
- A. My recollection was that in the investigative application

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that she would hear the commander, Kevin Peters, make comments about -- about the females who were victims and the situations that they were faced in. I don't have her notes specifically in front of me, but that's what led to us asking, you know, additional questions and follow-up.

- Q. Are her notes part of your file?
- A. They are.

- Q. Okay. And other than Kevin Peters, what about Chief Turner? Was there any reference made to him in this issue of gender-based stereotypes and bias?
- 11 A. I don't recall.
 - Q. Any lieutenants?
 - A. I don't recall. I only recall the commander at this point, but it was -- it seemed to be -- you know, as we started talking about earlier, you know, when things are not going right, we want to know why, this is the way we do it here, and our drill down into custom, which I think, you know, got better with JCPD over the years. I mean, we found less challenges in the 2021 and 2022 investigations than we did back in the '18, '19, '20 investigations. So the -- just as a totality, when we asked, well, why wasn't this investigated more and why didn't the investigators dig deeper, it was, well, you know, females -- if she was -- if she was in a -- in a relationship, or if she was formerly a prostitute, or she was a drug user, that those

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is this is what we knew, this is what the investigation found, is it a fair and full and clear investigation, and now if there's an issue with prosecution, then that is -- that is the job of the prosecutor. You know, it just -- most people have gotten away, and I even think your own DA has gotten away with the fact of you can't call a prosecutor and just say, hey, I want to -- you know, the victim doesn't want to -- doesn't return my calls. Okay, good, we're going to decline. That just doesn't -- it won't work in the last decade, so...

- Q. You say it's also a failure of supervisors. Can you elaborate on that? What is the supervisory failing here when a prosecutor declines to prosecute?
- A. Well, the supervisor has to approve the closure, so they have to approve and agree with the officer that the report is -- you know, that everything is good. And if I was a supervisor, I think the biggest area of concern is that they're not looking out for their people because if I was a sergeant, a lieutenant, and one of my investigators brought to me a closed and said, hey, I talked to the prosecutor and the prosecutor said that we're going to close this case, and I was like -- I would be, like, where is the evidence of that, where is the -- where is the form, where is the -- where is the E-mail, where is that?

 Just because they told that to you, I'd say, you know, if

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- Q. You mentioned Connecticut requiring an affidavit, for example. I know going on to Page 29 where you have a discussion that prosecution declined, you recommend an affidavit or a report. Do you know if there have been any changes, either at state or Johnson City level requirements as to better documenting a prosecution decline?
- A. I do recall in our conversation with the district attorney and his implementation of two new prosecutors that were the center point of contact that they were very stringent as to there were now very clear guidelines as -- which was identified in the DA's protocol as to how a case would be closed if it was closed. And the fact that these prosecutors were -- were, I guess, charged with a more detailed specific way of doing that, and I'm kind of just going off my memory here, that he also understood the significance for his people of being a failure that a case would come back and say prosecute -- prosecutor -- talked to the prosecutor and they declined. How do you know that? Maybe -- maybe the officer never talked to the prosecutor. We don't know that.
- Q. You -- you say the exceptional clearance rate for JCPD is

- A. Yeah, I think that's, you know, in the business we call it deliberately indifferent. I think you owe -- you know, a supervisor owes it to at least try to resolve this case to the best interest of the victim. And what's the harm, what's the foul? Unless -- unless you're telling me that there's just none available, then find one. But I wouldn't do that, I would reassign it.
- Q. Do you know who the investigator was in this case? Do the case notes reflect that?
- A. That's one of the failure parts of this report writing system was -- it says "I", but I don't know who "I" is, so I'm trying to see if there's any -- it's not jumping out at me.
- Q. Does it say who the sergeant was?
 - A. It says that the investigator refers to himself, obviously, as "I", and initially was the on-call investigator for the weekend, and was called by Captain Harrell. He might be the duty supervisor for the weekend. This is actually a very detailed report. I mean, there's a lot of information in this report. Not -- there's still a lot of questions in the report, but versus other reports, it's pretty -- it does -- there is a reference to Sergeant Hilton...
- 24 | Q. Okay.

25 A. ...on 6/26/19, talking about it looks like the mother

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- Q. Recommendation 4 states, JCPD's command staff and supervisors must provide oversight and be held accountable for the manner in which cases are closed. It sounds like from this recommendation that you're putting the accountability on the supervisors rather than the reporting officers, or at least the officers writing the reports. Is that fair?
- A. Well, if the -- you know it's kind of fair. I do believe the reason why we have supervisors is to make sure the officers do their job the way that they're supposed to do it. If the supervisors fail to address it, that only magnifies the failures. So, you know, if an officer might not understand the basis of an exceptional clearance or the officer may not understand what the policy says specifically as to how something is supposed to be done, but we hold the supervisors accountable for doing that.
- Q. Would you expect supervisors to be experienced and familiar with what constitutes a proper investigation?
- A. If they are assigned to the CID unit, I would say yes. A road supervisor, you know, they can come from all different -- they can come from all different levels of experience. That's why you have a lieutenant or a commander. There's other checks and balances. You know, not every -- not every supervisor is, you know, an expert or properly qualified to do investigations, that's why

- they're not in investigations. But -- but there should be some checks and balances, which there are. Like in this situation, if it's a significant case, it's gets assigned to CID. That's done because CID has the resources and the skill set to complete the job effectively.
- Q. In terms of this oversight, would you expect a lieutenant over CID to have this oversight?
 - A. I would expect the lieutenant to have knowledge of the proper mechanisms to conduct criminal investigations, yes.
- 10 | Q. And sex investigations specifically?
- 11 A. Any investigations, but specifically sex investigations, 12 yes.
 - Q. The same -- the same question for a captain over CID.
 - A. It matters, you know, what their -- what their involvement is. Remember, you know, a lieutenant -- a sergeant and a lieutenant are daily -- are working and are involved in the daily operations of the agency. If the captain is reviewing cases, if the captain is providing guidance, if the captain -- a lot of times captains have responsibilities for multiple areas. I guess the answer to that question depends on how involved in how the department operates CID.
- 23 | Q. What about a chief?
 - A. Well, the chief is the chief. And what that means is that he employees people below him or her to -- to ensure that

things are operating effectively. And unfortunately, the reason we see failures across the country is sometimes policy -- what we call customs or practices don't become known to the chief until they blow up. The question would be, you know, what did he know and when did he know it.

And, you know, he's -- a chief is not -- a chief in a normal agency is not involved in day-to-day operations. A chief has chief things to do. But that's why he has men and women below him who are responsible to ensure that those things don't fail.

- Q. Thank you. Turning on to the next finding about the internal affairs process and the Finding 5 that all complaints and misconduct against the department are timely investigated. Obviously, here -- well, strike that. Page 31, are you -- did you study any internal affairs investigations in the course of conducting your audit?
- A. I did not, no.

- Q. Okay. Did you ask for any?
- A. I met with the internal affairs commander and asked the internal affairs commander for any investigations or complaints made during this time frame specifically related to sexual assault investigations or sexual related crimes, and I was told that there was none and there were no investigations that fit that category. Since that's my

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- those have been assigned to someone with training in sexual assault investigations?
- A. Experience, yes.

- Q. Okay. If an investigator testified that he did not have particular training or experience in sexual assault cases, but was assigned to the Sean Williams cases nevertheless, would that be problematic in your view?
- MR. HERRIN: Object to the form of the question.
 - A. That would be problematic, yes.
- 10 | Q. And why would that be problematic?
 - A. Because it's like any type of investigation. I don't want

 -- I don't want investigators who are not properly
 qualified to do deadly force shooting cases doing deadly
 force shooting cases. When we -- I don't want homicide
 investigators -- I want them to be qualified and
 experienced to do homicide investigations. You know, the
 experience and the qualification based on your training is
 important for -- I mean, I think it's the duty that we owe
 to our citizens to give them the highest quality of
 investigation that is allowed.
 - Q. Okay. And recommendation 8c on Page 36, it talks about bias and also supervisory reviews bias. Is this essentially what we discussed earlier about explicit and implicit bias?
 - A. Yes, sir.

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Johnson City community and doing it correctly.

Unfortunately, you know, there are a lot -- there are

cases that actually getting streamed into certain

individuals and certain job postings that found to be

failures in this case. And, unfortunately, the department

is judged as a whole for the individuals that fail, but it

doesn't mean that there are not other men and women that

are doing the job the way that it's supposed to be done in

- Q. Do you have opinions on which individuals within the department did fail?
- A. Well, I think that the -- the assessment clearly identifies that if you are an investigator whose reports continue to become the topics of my -- my findings and my recommendations, that will -- that will give a funnel effect as to where the failures did occur in the agency that led to these challenges.
- Q. And that includes supervisors and command structure?
- A. Well, if they were responsible for overseeing them, then I would -- I would say yes.
 - Q. Okay. The next sentence talks about discrimination and law enforcement's handling of sexual assault reports harming public trust in the criminal justice system endangering victims and perpetuating negative stereotypes.

 What discrimination are you referring there to?

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Johnson City.

- Q. But to put it another way, you didn't intentionally go out to review particular cases that Kat Dahl was working on or referred to her?
- A. No.

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- Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion if a forcible rape is a more serious crime than a felon in possession of a firearm?
- MR. HERRIN: Object to the form of the question.
 - A. I mean, I think they're both pretty serious. You know -you know, the difficulty for me is I would say one with a
 victim and a victim that -- an identifiable victim where
 the gun -- gun with a firearm -- a felon with a firearm is
 -- doesn't have a victim. Victim-related crimes, I think,
 are the most significant crimes that law enforcement
 should be investigating.
 - Q. And is that particularly true when there were multiple victims with -- with reports of similar sex criminality against the same suspect?
- 18 \parallel MR. HERRIN: Object to the form of the question.
- 19 A. I can agree with that.
- Q. Sure. I mean, in other words, a serial rapist is more serious than a one-time rapist, although neither is good.
 - A. I can agree with both of those things, yes.
- Q. Okay, thank you. There were some recordings and conversations involving Ms. Dahl and officers at Johnson City Police Department. Did you ever listen to those or

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what is on the document versus common practice in the
industry. So I am assuming for purposes that everything
the officers put in there are truthful and accurate, and I
found no information that showed me that they weren't
being truthful and accurate, which is why I documented it
in that way. But I'm not doing an investigation to find
out whether they are being truthful and accurate, which
would require additional steps in an investigation. I'm
only assuming that they are based on the quality of their
work and the information that applied. And you're trying
you're asking me whether I know for a fact that they
are. I hope they are, but I don't know for a fact that
thev are.

- Q. Fair enough. This record keeping system you identified as the most significant failure that you came across, is that an accurate statement on Page 12 of your report?
- A. Yes, sir.

- Q. And the defects in a record keeping system are not the fault of individual investigating officers, is it?
- A. Well, they're not -- they're not -- yes, I think it's across the board. A system is only as good as the data you put in it. And unfortunately, the supervisors should have been mandating that the officers put more data in the system. And so the challenge that's faced here is that the system was archaic, antiquated, and difficult to use,

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but it is the system that you chose to use as a
department. So, you know, there is a requirement for the
officers to use whatever system they're provided and to,
you know, protect themselves as we would expect in the
proper documentation

- Q. As I understand your assessment of the record keeping system, it was a lack of a centralized collection process where you could go one location, find reports, video, photos, witness statements, all of that in just one available file. Is that a fair look at it?
- A. That's fair, yes, sir.

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- Q. It's already been mentioned that you found some paper records that had been shredded once a case was closed, or that there was a paper file somewhere that was hard to retrieve paper -- a paper document. Is that correct?
- A. That's what we were advised, yes.
- Q. But you did not find any evidence that investigators had destroyed evidence in any active investigation, did you?
- A. I don't know the answer to that, sir.
 - Q. Well, you would ask for and sometimes find a paper document that had been placed in a paper -- in a file somewhere. They would retrieve that after some effort.
- 23 A. That is accurate, yes, sir.
- Q. Okay. So you did not find where there were documents shredded, or not able to be found, or intentionally

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